

SECRET

Page 1 of
Enclosure No. 1
A-156 from SAIGON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

May 14, 1970

SUBJECT: Visit of Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Staff Members Lowenstein and Moose

1. Staff Del James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose initially visited Saigon from May 2 to May 4. A Memorandum for the Files covering this visit is at TAB A. They called briefly on Ambassador Berger on May 4 (MemCon at TAB B). They then departed for Phnom Penh without having made a decision on whether they would return to Saigon or continue on to Paris from Phnom Penh.
2. Staff Del Lowenstein and Moose returned from Phnom Penh on May 9, arriving at noon via an Air Cambodia charter flight. That afternoon they received a briefing by MACV J-2 and J-3 on US/ARVN military operations in Cambodia, particularly in the "Fish Hook" area and Operation Cuu Long 1, up the Mekong to Neak Loeng where Route 1 crosses the Mekong. Their impressions of the briefing and of their trip to Phnom Penh are best summarized in their telegram (Saigon 7214) to the Foreign Relations Committee at TAB C.
3. On May 10 Lowenstein and Moose surveyed operations in the Fish Hook area and along the Mekong River by helicopter. A detailed report by their MACV escort officer is at TAB D.
4. On May 11 they met with Mr. Phung Nhat Minh, Director of American and UN Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MemCon at TAB E), Mr. Shackley (reported separately), [REDACTED] 25X1A (MemCon at TAB F), and MG Nguyen Van Manh, Chief of Staff, Joint General Staff (MemCon at TAB G).
5. Immediately after their meeting with General Manh, Lowenstein and Moose sent the message (Saigon 7237) at TAB H to the Foreign Relations Committee. It points out General Manh denied any ARVN participation in the shipment of AK-47's or the dispatch of ethnic Cambodian CIDG troops to Cambodia. In the message they request guidance concerning further attempts to determine circumstances of the guns and troops being sent to Cambodia. The reply from the Chief of Staff of the Foreign Relations Committee is at TAB I.

SECRET

SECRET

Page 2 of
Enclosure No. 1
A-156 from SAIGON

6. Lowenstein and Moose were given a second briefing on May 12 by MACV J-2 and J-3, this time concerning operations in I Corps and II Corps. Before the briefing began, they reiterated their request for a detailed discussion of the circumstances concerning the supply of AK-47's, M-1's and M-2's and former CIDG troops to Cambodia.

7. Following the briefing they met with Ambassador Berger as reported in Saigon 7320.

8. They had been scheduled to receive a briefing from the 7th Air Force on U.S. air operations in Southeast Asia; however, this was cancelled in order to present a MACV J-4 briefing on the supply of guns and troops to Cambodia per their request. A MemCon concerning the J-4 briefing is at TAB J.

9. Immediately following the J-4 briefing, Lowenstein and Moose left for Paris via Bangkok by commercial air.

10. COMMENT: While Lowenstein and Moose asked a wide variety of questions during their various discussions and briefings, they concentrated on the following areas:

(a) What was the source (US- or ARVN-controlled stocks) of the weapons which have been sent to the Cambodian Government; who initiated and carried out planning for the shipment and how were the arms transported to Phnom Penh (via VNAF or USAF aircraft)?

(b) What were the circumstances of the CIDG troops transfer to Cambodia; did U.S. Special Forces advisers accompany them; are they still being paid by the USG; do they continue to receive US logistical support?

(c) Is there or has there been any political or military coordination among the GOC, GVN and USG concerning current operations in Cambodia? If so, by whom (military or civilian authorities) and at what level were they carried out?

(d) Had any consideration been given to the effect of the US/ARVN military operations on Cambodian civilians or on the

SECRET

SECRET

Page 3 of
Enclosure No. 1
A- 156 from SAIGON

titular control of the GOC over areas coming under US/ARVN control? If so, what plans have been made and/or carried out to assist Cambodian noncombatants?

(e) Before beginning the cross border operations, had the US and GVN given any consideration to the possible reaction of NVA/VC forces in Cambodia vis-a-vis the Lon Nol government as a result of the increased US/ARVN military pressure? If so, what was the official US/GVN prediction concerning the NVA/VC's reaction?

11. Lowenstein and Moose left Saigon not willing to admit that any of the answers given to them on these questions had been satisfactory.

Attachments:

TAB A - Memorandum for the Files, 5/5/70
TAB B - MemCon - Ambassador Berger
TAB C - Saigon 7214
TAB D - MACV trip report
TAB E - MemCon - Foreign Ministry Briefing
TAB F - MemCon - [REDACTED]
TAB G - MemCon - MG Nguyen Van Manh, JGS
TAB H - Saigon 7237
TAB I - State 071041
TAB J - MemCon, J-4 Briefing

25X1A

SECRET